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2
introduCtion
In an effort to stem violent conflict, the United Nations has increasingly turned to peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations.1 While these forces have had success in mitigat-
ing conflict, their efforts have also been tainted by allegations 
of violations of international humanitarian law (IHL). To date, 
the UN has not developed a comprehensive mechanism to 
investigate and punish such violations. In order to comply with 
IHL and to uphold the UN’s mission of promoting international 
cooperation, the UN must establish a clear framework to enforce 
the law of war within its own peacekeeping and peace enforce-
ment forces.
This article will begin with an introduction to UN peace 
operations, highlighting some cases of alleged abuse. The sec-
ond section will examine the applicability of IHL to the UN. 
First, the section will examine the nuances of IHL by describing 
the differences between international, non-international, and 
internationalized armed conflict. It will then demonstrate that 
the UN is bound by IHL. The article will conclude by examining 
several potential mechanisms to enforce the UN’s obligations 
under IHL: international state responsibility; domestic proceed-
ings in the troop-contributing state; human rights mechanisms; 
claims commissions; the International Criminal Court (ICC); 
and ombudspersons. Finally, the article will offer brief recom-
mendations for how the UN can ensure its compliance with IHL 
while adequately supporting victims’ needs.
an overvieW oF un PeaCe oPerations
Numerous terms have been used to describe “peacekeeping 
forces” including traditional peacekeeping, wider peacekeeping, 
peace enforcement, and peace support operations (PSOs). The 
UN itself uses terminology that differentiates between offensive 
and defensive peacekeeping forces. A UN panel, convened in 
2000 by the Secretary-General to examine peace operations in 
the United Nations context, used the term “peace operations” as 
an umbrella term covering “conflict prevention and peacemak-
ing; peacekeeping; and peace-building.”2 These forces, autho-
rized under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, are characterized by 
impartiality in the conflict.3 This paper will use the term PSO 
popularized by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
and scholars such as Marten Zwanenburg, legal counsel at 
the Ministry of Defense of the Netherlands, to describe those 
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Chapter VI-authorized actions based on the consent of the bel-
ligerent parties.4
Alternatively, UN peace enforcement operations are those 
actions which constitute a “forcible military intervention[] by 
one or more states into a third country with the express objective 
of maintaining or restoring . . . peace and security by ending a 
violent conflict within that country.”5 These forces, authorized 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, are characterized by their 
explicit authorization to use force in defense of the mandate 
— typically to establish peace and order.6 While academically 
these two different types of operations may seem separate and 
distinct, on the ground, UN operations rarely neatly fit into a 
single category.
The UN operation in Somalia demonstrates how easily 
operational mandates may shift. In early 1992, Somalia’s 
civil war had caused a humanitarian crisis.7 The UN Security 
Council responded by first authorizing the United Nations 
Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) “to monitor the cease-fire in 
Mogadishu”8 and protect deliveries of humanitarian aid within 
Mogadishu. The Security Council later expanded the force’s 
mandate to all of Somalia.9 In December of the same year, the 
Security Council issued a resolution, this time under Chapter 
VII, changing the force’s mandate yet again and authorizing the 
UN “and Member States . . . to use all necessary means to estab-
lish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian 
relief operations in Somalia.”10 Pursuant to Resolution 794, 
the UN created an offensive force named Unified Task Force 
(UNITAF), which delegated much of the authority for enforcing 
the peace to the U.S. Central Command as well as forces from 
other states.11 In 1993, the Security Council further expanded 
the UNOSOM mandate by creating UNOSOM II, which 
authorized the force to (1) prevent the resumption of violence, 









UN peacekeepers in Kigali, Rwanda.
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(3) “[protect] ‘as required’ of UN, [ICRC], and NGO personnel, 
installations and equipment,” and (4) “control of heavy weap-
ons.”12 Such modification of the mandates had a legal effect on 
the amount of force that could be authorized and, as such, modi-
fied the legal status of the parties to the conflict.
 Both UN PSOs and enforcement operations have been 
subject to allegations of human rights and humanitarian law 
violations. For example, the UN forces in Somalia were alleged 
to have committed violations of IHL, including torture and the 
targeting of civilians.13 The current UN force in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (MONUC), established in 1999 under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter,14 has been plagued by allega-
tions of sexual misconduct.15 Many other UN operations, includ-
ing those in “Haiti, Mozambique, East Timor, Bosnia, Kosovo 
and Cambodia,”16 also have been accused of abuses such as rape 
or trafficking in persons.17
In the 1990s, after recognizing deficiencies in the regulation 
of UN PSO and enforcement operations, the UN issued two 
major reports aimed at reforming UN peace operations: The 
Secretary-General’s Bulletin on Observance by United Nations 
Forces of International Humanitarian Law (the Secretary-
General’s Bulletin);18 and The Report of the Panel on UN Peace 
Operations (the Brahimi Report).19 Notably, in outlining the 
need for reform, the Brahimi Report specifically acknowledged 
the “essential importance of the United Nations [in] promoting 
. . . [IHL] in all aspects of its peace and security activities.”20 
While the Brahimi Report suggests more than eighty ways for 
the UN to reform their PSO and enforcement operations,21 
rather than focusing on violations of IHL, most recommenda-
tions focus on clarifying administrative deficiencies, including 
increased headquarters capacity, increased communication and 
cooperation across the mission, and more rapid troop deploy-
ments.22 
Neither the Secretary-General’s Bulletin nor the Brahimi 
Report effectively clarify the scope of IHL’s applicability to UN 
forces, how the UN can enforce its obligations under IHL, or 
how best to ensure accountability. Indeed, the Brahimi Report 
mentions accountability only twice — both times only in refer-
ence to procurement and spending.23 The Secretary-General’s 
Bulletin argues that violations of IHL and “national law” are to 
be handled by the sending-state’s domestic courts.24 However, 
as this paper will demonstrate, domestic jurisdictions do not 
adequately ensure compliance with the principles of IHL or 
guarantee victims the right to redress.
aPPliCability oF ihl to Pso  
and enForCement oPerations
The application of IHL, which regulates the conduct of 
hostilities, is triggered by armed conflict.25 The International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) defined 
armed conflict as the “resort to armed force between States 
or protracted armed violence between governmental authori-
ties and organized armed groups or between such groups in a 
State.”26 No formal declaration is required.
Several different sources of law make up the corpus of 
modern IHL, including Hague law, Geneva law, and customary 
international law. While historically some have highlighted the 
different roles of each source of IHL, Yoram Dinstein, Professor 
of International Law and President of the Tel Aviv University, 
calls these distinctions “outdated.”27 The International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) has also confirmed that the multiple branches of 
IHL constitute a single body of law governing armed conflict.28
Basic application of international Humanitarian law 
The application of IHL is not contingent on the moral or 
ethical status of the parties to the conflict.29 IHL distinguishes 
between the legality of the outbreak of conflict (jus ad bellum) 
and the conduct of the hostilities (jus in bello),30 and binds all 
parties to the conflict equally. UN authorization does not affect 
the application of the law.31 Indeed, a party to a conflict cannot 
use its status as a member of a collective security force or PSO 
to justify breaches of IHL.32
IHL does, however, distinguish between international and 
non-international armed conflict. IHL has traditionally regu-
lated international armed conflict to a greater extent than non-
international armed conflict. In international armed conflict, at a 
minimum, the Hague Conventions, the Geneva Conventions, and 
other customary sources of IHL regulate the conduct of hostili-
ties. Professor Dinstein aptly notes the importance of applying 
customary international law to international armed conflict as 
“no single treaty – and no cluster of treaties – purports to cover 
the whole span of [international armed conflict].”33 Additional 
Protocol I to the Geneva Convention also recalls the important 
role of customary law in regulating armed conflict, declaring 
“[i]n cases not covered by this Protocol or by other international 
agreements, civilians and combatants remain under the protec-
tion and authority of the principles of international law derived 
from established custom, from the principles of humanity 
and from the dictates of public conscience.”34 Accordingly, in 
instances of international armed conflict, parties are bound by 
not only the text of relevant conventions, but also by customary 
international law.
IHL also covers non-international armed conflict. To be 
covered, non-international armed conflict must meet a certain 
“minimum level of intensity,”35 and non-international distur-
bances, riots, and isolated or sporadic acts of violence are gener-
ally not regulated by IHL. Non-international armed conflict is, at 
a minimum, regulated by Common Article Three to the Geneva 
Conventions and customary international law. This corpus of 
law creates fundamental standards for all non-international 
armed conflict, which include the prohibition against torture 
and the principles of proportionality, necessity, and distinction. 
Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions also governs 
the conflict if the state has ratified that instrument,36 though the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Customary 
International Law Study alleges that much of Additional Protocol 
II has achieved the status of customary international law.37
IHL also regulates the conduct of hostilities in so-called 
internationalized armed conflict. A conflict is internationalized 
when a foreign state intervenes in a non-international armed 
conflict. For example, the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan cre-
ated “an international armed conflict as between the United 
States and Afghanistan,”38 but the conflict between Taliban and 
the Northern Alliance fighters arguably remained regulated by 
relevant rules of non-international armed conflict. The ICJ in the 
Nicaragua case affirmatively recognized this hybrid application 
of IHL. The ICJ detailed that a single conflict may be governed 
by the regulations of both non-international armed conflict and 
international armed conflict, depending on the status of the par-
ties.39 Furthermore, the ICTY determined it had the authority to 
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simultaneously adjudicate both interstate and intrastate conflict 
in Bosnia.40
tHe application of iHl to un-mandated forces
The ICJ has ruled that the UN is “an international per-
son,” which can be subject to international law,41 such as 
IHL.42 A crucial factor in determining the applicability of 
IHL on UN-mandated forces is determining whether the UN 
is “the responsible entity for conduct of [the] operation.”43 
UN-mandated forces are subject to UN control, and for the 
purposes of the applicability of IHL, it can be said that the UN 
is in the position to exercise command and control over the UN 
PSO or enforcement force. Because the UN has control over 
the forces, the organization is bound to comply with IHL pro-
visions “in all circumstances by United Nations forces which 
are engaged in hostilities.”44 The UN itself has recognized the 
applicability of the humanitarian legal regime on UN forces, 
with the Secretary-General’s Bulletin arguing that IHL applies 
to UN “forces when in situations of armed conflict they are 
actively engaged therein as combatants,” even if the combat is 
in self defense.45 
IHL, however, regulates UN PSOs and enforcement opera-
tions to different extents. The UN agrees that when PSOs are 
“actively engaged” in combat, the provisions of IHL detailed 
in the Secretary-General’s Bulletin are applicable “to the extent 
and for the duration of their engagement.”46 However, the UN 
has not clarified exactly what constitutes “actively engaged” in 
combat or what applicable “to the extent and for the duration 
of their engagement” means for the application of IHL.47 In 
peace enforcement operations, IHL should apply “[f]rom the 
moment a state takes action using military force on the territory 
of another without the permission of the government of the lat-
ter, [and] armed conflict exists.”48 In instances where a Chapter 
VI peacekeeping force regularly uses offensive military force, it 
should be viewed as a de facto Chapter VII peace enforcement 
operation.49
Marten Zwanenburg notes that in the past actors have only 
found that a UN PSO is party to a conflict if high levels of 
violence exist. This scope of application comes from a desire to 
“consider an operation as impartial, and as a consequence not 
a party to the conflict, as long as possible.”50 However, IHL is 
based on an objective test of the level of violence, not the moral 
status of the parties;51 therefore, the deployment of a PSO force 
does not subject it to different regulations pertaining to the 
application of IHL. When a PSO engages in activity that reaches 
the level of armed conflict under IHL, the relevant provisions of 
IHL will regulate its conduct.
Another manner in which UN-sponsored PSOs may be 
bound by IHL is through the law of occupation. The Hague 
Conventions and Geneva Conventions explicitly state that IHL 
applies in cases of occupation,52 and some scholars suggest that 
if the PSO is the “sole authority capable of exercising control 
over the civilian population,” they will be an occupier under 
international law.53 The law of occupation imposes numerous 
privileges and duties upon the occupying force — including 
adherence to IHL.
wHat Humanitarian law applies to tHe un?
The UN and other interested stakeholders must first deter-
mine what branch of IHL applies to UN forces — the law of 
international armed conflict, non-international armed conflict, 
or a hybrid application. Different instruments regulate each 
Member State of the UN, depending on the state’s accession to 
different IHL instruments. Indeed, because the UN has not rati-
fied any IHL instrument, the organization cannot clearly dictate 
what law applies to its forces.54 While some Member States 
may be subject to additional regulations, the UN itself likely 
is subject only to those provisions of IHL that are classified as 
customary law.
Determining what constitutes customary IHL is often dif-
ficult when applied to states;55 and its applicability to the UN is 
even more perplexing. For example, while the ICRC alleges that 
almost all of the Additional Protocols are customary law,56 the 
United States contends that some elements of the Protocol have 
not reached the status of customary law.57 Furthermore, under 
international law, if a state persistently and constantly objects 
to the creation of a customary norm, it will not bind that state. 
Scholars have suggested that the United States, and potentially 
France and Great Britain, likely qualify as persistent objectors to 
some elements of Additional Protocol I.58 These ambiguities in 
IHL is based on an objective test of the level of 
violence, not the moral status of the parties; therefore,  
the deployment of a PSO force does not subject it to 
different regulations pertaining to the application of IHL. 
When a PSO engages in activity that reaches the level  
of armed conflict under IHL, the relevant provisions  
of IHL will regulate its conduct.
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the status of the law may create difficulties in application if, as in 
the case of Somalia, the United States was participating in a UN 
action with the military forces of other member states that might 
have accepted the customary nature of Additional Protocol I.
Second, the UN must determine if PSO and enforcement 
operations are classified as international or non-international 
armed conflicts for the purposes of IHL. As elucidated by the 
ICJ’s Nicaragua and Tadic decisions, international and non-
international armed conflicts may exist in the same battlefield 
at the same time, depending on the status of the belligerents. 
Accordingly, UN intervention in a non-international armed 
conflict could internationalize that conflict as to the UN forces 
while leaving the rules of non-international armed conflict to 
apply among domestic forces. Therefore, any conflict between 
the UN forces and domestic forces should be viewed as an inter-
national armed conflict as the UN constitutes an international 
force.
After determining what branch of IHL applies to UN forces, 
the organization must develop a mechanism to suppress such 
violations.
meChanisms to suPPress violations oF ihl
Entities regulated by IHL have an obligation to both educate 
their forces in IHL in order to reduce collateral casualties59 and 
to “devise and implement appropriate mechanisms to ensure 
that the obligations imposed under [IHL] are respected.”60 There 
are numerous ambiguities in the application and enforcement 
of IHL in regards to United Nations forces. Therefore, the UN 
should establish an effective and clear mechanism whereby 
victims of alleged violations of IHL can seek redress. Such a 
program is essential in establishing the rule of law and account-
ability in the post-conflict and conflict areas where PSO and 
enforcement forces operate.
As the following sections will establish, victims of IHL 
violations by a UN PSO or peace enforcement operation are 
forced to choose from several different mechanisms that are 
poorly suited to enforce their rights. Victims may claim the 
international responsibility of the sending state or the indi-
vidual under international law; may issue claims against the 
individuals responsible for the alleged human rights violations; 
or may potentially seek to bring claims directly against the UN, 
as troop-sending states may lack the resources to compensate 
victims. However, these current mechanisms are inefficient and 
hard for victims to identify. This section will examine the limi-
tations of existing mechanisms before suggesting alternatives in 
order to elucidate how the UN can more effectively implement 
its obligations under international law to ensure compliance with 
IHL obligations.
international state responsiBility
Marten Zwanenburg recalls that “all international rights 
entail international responsibility.”61 The International Law 
Commission Draft Articles on State Responsibility, which 
examine the role of states in the international system,62 note that 
the “conduct of a state organ does not lose that quality because 
that conduct is, for example, coordinated by an international 
organization, or is even authorized by it.”63 Ultimately, the 
Commission adopted the principle that an injured state, indi-
vidually or in conjunction with a group of states, may raise the 
issue of international responsibility under international law.
Such a doctrine of state responsibility is not sufficient to 
implement the UN’s obligations under IHL. Injured states are the 
only entities that may initiate claims. History shows that alleged 
violations of IHL by PSOs and enforcement operations typically 
occur in destabilized regions where the host government may not 
have the capacity to bring a claim for the violation on behalf the 
state.64 For example, in the case of Somalia, no central govern-
ment existed that could pursue a claim under state responsibility 
for alleged violations of IHL. The inability of victims to directly 
claim a violation of the law of armed conflict by PSO or peace 
enforcement operations may cause significant harm to victims 
by denying them adequate redress while simultaneously ineffec-
tively enforcing the IHL obligations of the force.65
action in tHe Jurisdiction of tHe sending state
The Secretary-General’s Bulletin,66 the International Law 
Association, and legal experts all recommend that violations 
of IHL be adjudicated in national courts.67 While such a forum 
offers a familiar jurisdiction for adjudicating claims, it is insuf-
ficient for several reasons. First, such proceedings generally 
cannot include the UN as it is generally “immune from legal 
proceedings in local courts.”68 Because the majority of UN 
forces come from countries still developing their economic and 
legal institutions,69 it is unlikely that their domestic courts could 
effectively handle the complicated allegations of abuse occur-
ring a great distance from their courts or have access to funds 
to compensate potential victims. Additionally, having such an 
obligation would serve as a disincentive for troop-contributing 
states to place their military under the jurisdiction of the UN.
Secondly, IHL has traditionally been seen as “governing 
relations between states,” not between individuals and a state.70 
While it is generally accepted that IHL may “confer[] rights on 
individuals[,]” there are significant procedural hurdles for an 
individual enforcing these rights in a state court of the alleged 
abuser.71 Applicants have attempted to use Article 3 of the 1907 
Hague Convention (IV) relating to compensation72 to sue for 
alleged violations in domestic courts; however, most domestic 
courts have ruled that Article 3 grants a right to compensation 




















UN tanks in Kismayo, Somalia during Operation CONTINUE HOPE 
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Thirdly, domestic tort actions are “only available in 
exceptional cases,” typically relying “on a domestic tort but 
implicat[ing] an international violation.”74 These types of actions 
have been unsuccessful due to procedural hurdles, such as the 
requirement that victims initiate proceedings in person.75 These 
obstacles “effectively discriminate[] against victims who cannot 
afford to travel to the state in question”76 and create problems for 
victims seeking to enforce their rights under IHL.
Finally, by relying on each troop-contributing state to enforce 
the rights and obligations of IHL, the independence of the UN 
may be minimized; indeed the “legitimacy[,]” impartiality, “and 
effectiveness of the UN” may suffer.77 IHL could be ambigu-
ously applied if domestic jurisdictions of states that have ratified 
different instruments are responsible for adjudicating claimed 
violations of those instruments.78 
Human rigHts mecHanisms
In recent years, some scholars and practitioners have sug-
gested that regional human rights bodies might be an acceptable 
jurisdiction to adjudicate alleged violations of IHL.79 While 
human rights law allows victims to claim a breach of obliga-
tions by a state, most human rights bodies have been resistant 
in applying IHL.80 
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, in the 
Las Palmeras case before the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights (IACtHR), argued that the Commission had the authority 
to apply “the norms embodied in . . . customary [IHL] applicable 
to internal armed conflicts and enshrined in Article 3, common 
to all the 1949 Geneva Conventions.”81 The Colombian govern-
ment asserted that the Commission exceeded its mandate and 
that the IACtHR lacked the competency to apply IHL, because 
it was not specifically provided for in its mandate.82 In response 
to these conflicting arguments, the IACtHR overruled some of 
the Commission’s analysis, and “refus[ed] to examine norms 
falling outside the text of the []American Convention” such 
as the customary nature of common Article 3.83 However, the 
Court did not preclude the application of IHL norms in those 
instances where the norms were also contained in the American 
Convention.84
The European Court of Human Rights, in the Bankovic case, 
limited the territorial applicability of the European Convention 
on Human Rights, ruling that the Convention “was not designed 
to be applied throughout the world.”85 This case demonstrates 
the ineffectiveness of the Court as a forum for the adjudication 
of claims of alleged IHL violations by PSO or enforcement 
forces because violations must occur within territory governed 
by the Convention to fall under the jurisdiction of the Court.86
Case law from the regional human rights bodies elucidates 
that human rights courts likely do not serve as an effective 
forum “to improve the implementation of IHL” among PSO 
and enforcement operations.87 The Bankovic and Las Palmeras 
cases, in particular, illustrate the difficulty of obtaining judg-
ments against the perpetrators of violations of IHL in regional 
human rights systems. Accordingly, such mechanisms do not 
currently provide adequate enforcement mechanisms for viola-
tions of IHL by PSO or peace enforcement forces.
claims commissions 
Claims commissions may serve as a model for how the UN 
can compensate victims for damage arising from UN opera-
tions; however, they do not serve as an effective enforcement 
mechanism because they are not concerned with deterring 
violations of IHL. There are several examples of claims com-
missions attempting to offer monetary redress for violations of 
IHL including the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission88 and 
the UN’s Civil Claims Unit.89 In 1991, the UN also established 
a compensation commission for damages arising out of “Iraq’s 
unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait.”90 This tribunal 
did not specifically adjudicate alleged violations of IHL, though 
it did serve as a forum whereby host governments could submit 
complaints on behalf of their on citizens for alleged violations.91 
Such commissions may play a role in awarding compensation to 
victims, but they do not address the UN’s obligations to ensure 
its forces comply with IHL. If such a commission is to be used 
to satisfy an alleged violation, it ought to be used in conjunction 
with a different body that can effectively ensure compliance 
with IHL.
tHe international criminal court
The International Criminal Court (ICC) serves as another 
potential venue for the adjudication of alleged IHL violations. 
However, the crimes enumerated in the Rome Statute make it 
highly unlikely that PSO or enforcement operations could fall 
under the Court’s jurisdiction.92 Crimes against humanity require 
widespread attacks directed against the civilian population as an 
element of the crime.93 Genocide requires that the intent to 
destroy “a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.”94 Such 
definitions are beyond the scope of crimes alleged to have been 
committed by the UN to date, and it seems unlikely that a UN 
force could engage in such widespread violation of the law.
War crimes committed by PSO and enforcement operations, 
however, arguably could fall under the jurisdiction of the ICC 
should the attacks reach the gravity threshold and other require-
ments of the Rome Statute.95 However, Professor Harrington 
of McGill University notes the difficulty of holding PSO or 
enforcement operations accountable under the Rome Statute, 
given that the Statute authorizes prosecution of individuals for 
war “crimes which are part of a concerted effort or plan, rather 
than those which are indiscriminately carried out for personal 
gratification or other non-concerted reasons.”96 An examination 
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suggests that most alleged abuses involve unorganized and indis-
criminate violence as opposed to coordinated attacks against the 
civilian population. Furthermore, while the Rome Statute crimi-
nalizes sexual violence and other crimes alleged to have been 
committed by peacekeepers, prosecutions under the Statute tend 
to focus on those individuals who order or plan such crimes, as 
opposed to the individual perpetrators.97 
Additionally, jurisdictional obstacles may prevent the ICC 
from exercising jurisdiction over alleged crimes committed by 
PSO or enforcement operations. First, the ICC operates under 
a system of complementarity with national jurisdictions. For 
the ICC to exercise jurisdiction, the Court must find that the 
state is unable or unwilling to prosecute crimes falling within 
the jurisdiction of the ICC. Accordingly, much like the interna-
tional system in place today, the ICC gives primacy to national 
jurisdictions to enforce the laws of war on peacekeepers. The 
UN generally signs Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs) with 
the national government of the territory where PSO or enforce-
ment forces operate, and these generally govern UN operations. 
SOFAs typically preclude national governments from exercising 
jurisdiction over alleged crimes committed by the respective 
country’s forces operating within their territory. However many 
states, such as the United States, have agreements under Article 
98 of the Rome Statute whereby host states may not transfer U.S. 
soldiers to ICC jurisdiction.
omBudspersons
The concept of ombudsperson originated in the domestic 
law of several European countries. An ombudsperson may 
“receive complaints, investigate and make recommendations to 
the relevant authority, but [ombudspersons typically] lack the 
authority to enforce the recommendations.”98 The Organization 
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) suggested 
that international institutions use ombudspersons as a “way to 
promote and protect human rights” and IHL.99 There are sev-
eral examples of the effective use of an ombudsperson within 
international organizations. In 1994, the World Bank was the 
first organization to establish an ombudsperson within an inter-
national organization.100 The United Nations Mission in Kosovo 
marked the UN’s first attempt to incorporate an ombudsperson 
into a UN mission.
World Bank Ombudsperson
The World Bank incorporated the ombudsperson concept 
in the World Bank Inspection Panel.101 The panel provides 
“innovative access to international administrative remedies for 
non-governmental actors”102 and extends jurisdiction to those 
claims “from persons claiming to be affected by a World Bank 
project.”103 A party may apply for an inspection if the party 
can “demonstrate that its rights or interests have been or are 
likely to be directly affected by an action or omission of the 
Bank . . . .”104 The inspection panel then reports its finding on 
compliance to the Executive Directors;105 however, such deci-
sions are not binding.106
United Nations Mission in Kosovo 
The United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) incorpo-
rated an ombudsperson into the international mission.107 Marten 
Zwanenburg asserts that the unique status of the UNMIK forces 
as both a PSO and transitional administration gave rise to the 
creation of the ombudsperson.108 The ombudsperson in Kosovo 
was tasked with “promot[ing] and protect[ing] the rights and 
freedoms of individuals and legal entities and ensur[ing] that 
all persons in Kosovo are able to exercise effectively [their] 
human rights and fundamental freedoms . . . .”109 The “standard 
of review” for the ombudsperson was “whether there has been 
a violation of human rights and ‘abuse of authority’” by UN or 
coalition forces.110
Marten Zwanenburg highlights that the ombudsperson in 
Kosovo actually used IHL “as a standard of reference” in making 
its recommendations.111 For example, the ombudsperson issued 
a report on “[t]hird party claims for property loss or damage . 
. . arising from or directly attributable” to the United Nations 
forces.112 The report noted that IHL may be required to interpret 
provisions of human rights law.113 The UNMIK ombudsperson 
also “deliberately [left] open the possibility that [IHL]” could be 
applicable to the United Nations forces in Kosovo.114
While the Kosovo ombudsperson marked a significant step 
in the ability of the United Nations to effectively enforce its 
obligations under IHL, “the [UN] Ombudsperson [in Kosovo] 
lacked any power to do more than publicize his [or her] find-
ings.”115 Publication of these findings, however, played a sig-
nificant role in influencing UNMIK policy. For example, after 
the ombudsperson reported unlawful detention procedures in 
Kosovo, UNMIK responded by establishing a Commission to 
review the legality of the detentions.116 Nonetheless, without the 
authority to issue binding regulations, there is a possibility that 
the rights of victims could be superseded by political and public 
relations concerns.
ConClusions and reCommendations
As UN forces have become increasingly active in areas 
traditionally reserved for states, allegations of misconduct have 
increased. Yet, a lacuna exists in the regulation of UN-sponsored 
PSO and peace enforcement forces. The UN must proactively 
confront this lack of regulation in order to maintain compliance 
with IHL, the spirit of the UN Charter, and the mission of pro-
moting the rule of law.
International state responsibility, national jurisdiction, 
human rights mechanisms, the ICC, and claims commissions 
will not adequately enforce compliance of IHL by UN forces. 
Accordingly, a permanent PSO and peace enforcement ombud-
sperson should be created to ensure compliance with the law.117 
The mandate of the UNMIK ombudsperson allowed wide 
discretion to investigate alleged abuse. A permanent ombud-
sperson must also be free from political influence and able to 
compel state and UN compliance with enforceable and binding 
decisions.118 This permanent ombudsperson should be given 
the authority to promote and protect the rights, freedoms, and 
protections provided by IHL of all individuals and legal entities 
operating in areas of United Nations peace support and peace 
enforcement operations without interference from member 
states.
In addition to the ombudsperson, the UN should establish a 
permanent claims commission to work with the ombudsperson 
to compensate victims. While this commission may be based on 
state referral or consent, it would be valuable in ensuring the 
rights of victims by establishing clear procedures for referral 
by victims if the state government does not have the capacity. 
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The UN Peacekeeping commission should have “investigative 
capacities” like the World Bank Inspection Panel so that it does 
not have to rely on only one source of information in evaluating 
claims.119 Furthermore, whenever a mission is established, rep-
resentatives of this commission should be deployed to the host 
state to ensure that victims are aware of their right of compen-
sation. The decisions of this commission should be binding on 
both the UN and the troop-contributing states so that victims of 
abuse are guaranteed redress. This permanent position could be 
responsible for all claims against UN PSO and peace enforce-
ment forces and could serve to help increase the credibility of 
the UN force amongst the local population and promote the rule 
of law.
The UN plays an invaluable role around the world promoting 
peace; however, the organization must do more to ensure com-
pliance of its forces with IHL. Such compliance with the laws 
of war will limit civilian casualties, help facilitate the transition 
to peace, and encourage representative government based on the 
rule of law. A permanent ombudsperson and claims commission 
could do much to promote this accountability.  HRB
As UN forces have become increasingly active in areas 
traditionally reserved for states, allegations of misconduct 
have increased. Yet, a lacuna exists in the regulation of 
UN-sponsored PSO and peace enforcement forces. The 
UN must proactively confront this lack of regulation in 
order to maintain compliance with IHL, the spirit of the 
UN Charter, and the mission of promoting the rule of law. 
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